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The Promises, Problems and Possibilities —
Part I
Dr. Patrica C. Elliott, CPA
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
If Diogenes were around today he would 
have more difficulty finding a person 
satisfied with the present Social Security 
system than he had finding the honest 
man (sic). Working wives are unhappy 
because their husbands are not routinely 
covered as are the wives of working hus­
bands; poor people and liberals are un­
happy because the tax is regressive in na­
ture; the conservatives are unhappy be­
cause the benefit structure is geared more 
toward need than based on contributions 
the way private annuities are; retired 
people are unhappy because their pen­
sions are not keeping pace with the cost- 
of-living index; employers and employees 
are unhappy because the rate is a whop­
ping 5.85% on the first $15,300 of gross 
salary per year and both the rate and the 
base are scheduled to rise in the future; 
economists are unhappy because (unless 
something is done soon) the current tax 
rate will have to be tripled in the next 75 
years to cover the widening deficit; tax­
payers are unhappy because over one-half 
of them paid more in Social Security taxes 
than they did in income taxes last year; 
politicians are unhappy because all of their 
constituents are unhappy (and unhappy 
voters tend to vote the old rascals out and 
the new rascals in); and the Social Security 
Administration is unhappy because 
everybody is blaming them and they do 
not like the situation any better than any­
body else. The most tragic fact of all is that 
all these people are absolutely right — the 
present Social Security system does do all 
these things to all these people.
How could a system with such a socially 
desirable and benevolent purpose be so 
positively messed up? One way to answer 
this question is to examine the evolution of 
the Social Security laws and perhaps sort 
through how the original goals changed 
because of changing social and political 
mores. There may or may not be a way to 
appease everyone but it might be useful to 
examine some suggested alternatives.
The Promises
The Social Security Act of 1935 was signed 
into law by President Roosevelt amidst 
many misgivings by the population of 
Depression-era America. The Depression 
had clearly shown that some type of finan­
cial security was desperately needed by 
older people, yet the majority of the popu­
lation was afraid that such a system would 
undermine the Puritan-ethic based ideas 
of thrift and hard work. The original law 
was not intended to provide an adequate 
pension for comfortable living in the 
worker's old age; it was intended to be a 
supplement to personal savings and a bare 
minimum or "floor of protection" for re­
tirees.
Prior to this law it was assumed that the 
worker would work until death or be sup­
ported by family members and savings in 
cases of illness or disability. The assump­
tion was not too unreasonable for several 
reasons. First, the population was pre­
dominantly rural, where three genera­
tions in a family dwelling was not un­
common. In a rural setting, workers were 
still valuable even if the tasks assumed in 
old age were different from those per­
formed during one's youth. It simply took 
all hands to keep a family farm operating. 
Even in the cities it was more usual for 
older people to live with grown children 
than to maintain a separate household1 
and to continue working into their old age.
The life expectancy for all Americans 
was substantially shorter than it is now. 
The life expectancy for a man in 1910 was
46.3 years; by 1970 it had risen to 67.1. A 
female's life expectancy rose during that 
period from 48.3 years to 74.6 years.2
After the passage of the Social Security 
Act of 1935 (but before any payments to 
retirees were made), two major changes in 
emphasis occurred: first, the funding of 
benefits was put on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
It was quickly recognized that no mean­
ingful benefits could be paid for several 
years if benefits were to be based on the 
retiree's contributions. The second shift 
was to emphasize the social and financial 
need of the recipients and the benefits 
were heavily weighted in favor of low 
income workers and workers with depen­
dent wives. Thus, before the first pay­
ments were made in 1940, the function of 
Social Security had been split into two 
(sometimes incompatible) functions: The 
welfare function and the insurance (an­
nuity) function.
With World War II industrialization and 
urbanization flowered along with the 
breaking up of extended families. With the 
movement of women into the labor force 
during the war and the subsequent post­
war baby boom, it became more attractive 
to retire older workers in order to make 
room for younger ones.
Dr. Alicia Munnell, an economist rec­
ognized as an expert on Social Security, 
maintains that Social Security has histori­
cally had a dual impact on retirement and 
savings.3 First, an employee was less re­
luctant to require an employee who had a 
pension (Social Security) to retire than one 
who did not. Since Social Security cover­
age is mandatory (with a few exceptions), 
almost all employees were covered and 
the trend toward forced retirement at the 
arbitrary age of 65 (the age at which bene­
fits were originally paid) was begun. Since 
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people then began to expect to retire at 65 
and had a longer life expectancy, they 
began to save more to supplement their 
modest Social Security benefits. This was 
in contrast to the opposite impact of hav­
ing less to save because of the Social Secu­
rity tax one had to pay. The dual effects 
tended to negate each other with the ten­
dency being toward more total savings.
Since 1945 the system has been radically 
expanded. Because increasing the benefits 
and coverage was a politically "good” 
thing to do, the coverage and benefits 
were raised astronomically. The 
maximum benefits for a retiree and de­
pendent spouse have risen from about 
$150 per month in 1955 to almost $600 per 
month in 1976.4 Benefits for survivors, 
disability and hospital insurance were 
added to the original pension. Any time 
benefits were raised, they were extended 
to cover not only current retirees but pres­
ent workers when they did retire in the 
future. As the benefits expanded, the 
maximum taxes to support the expendi­
tures have risen from about $200 per year 
in 1955 to $1,800 per year in 1976. (Half is 
withheld from the employee and half is 
paid by the employer.)5
With Congress constantly raising bene­
fits (a politically expedient thing to do) and 
tying benefits to the inflation rate, they are 
spending nonexistent funds and are 
promising workers huge benefits for 
which funding has not yet been arranged.
The Problems
With the rapidly rising benefits workers 
have begun to view Social Security not as a 
"floor” to be supplemented by private sav­
ings, but as their total retirement savings. 
As rates of taxation rise, workers expect 
their future benefits to rise when in actual­
ity the increased taxes are going to pay off 
present retirees' increased benefits. Still, 
people cling to the idea that their taxes are 
funding their future benefits. Some6 feel 
the Social Security Administration en­
courages this belief by talking about the 
"huge reserves” (which will, in fact, be 
totally exhausted by 1980) in such a way as 
to make the public believe that their pen­
sions are, in fact, funded. John A. Brittain, 
a Brookings Institute economist, does not 
worry about the "bankruptcy" of the sys­
tem because Social Security is "backed by 
the most solid source of funds known, the 
federal taxing power. The bankruptcy 
charge is a senseless generator of fear.”7
If the bankruptcy scare is senseless, cer­
tain other facts are not. All predicted taxes 
are based on population estimates which 
have been radically altered by the falling 
birth rate. While life expectancies have 
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risen very little in 20 years, the birth rate 
has declined dramatically. A major popu­
lation shift is occurring: One in seven 
Americans is now receiving Social Secu­
rity and by 2005 there may be only two 
workers to support each pensioner.8
Since benefits are tied to inflation, the 
expenditures in the past few years of 
double-digit inflation have exceeded all 
projections. Furthermore, there is a built- 
in double inflation raise. No one objects 
too much to raising retirees' benefits, but 
under the 1972 formula (which tied bene­
fits to inflation), an oversight occurred. 
Not only are retirees' pensions raised for 
inflation, future retirees' pensions are 
raised. Those who are not yet retired pre­
sumably receive inflation-keyed raises 
which automatically give them higher 
scheduled benefits by putting them in 
higher maximum benefit brackets. This, 
coupled with the additional inflation raise, 
gives present workers a double adjust­
ment upwards for inflation. If rapid infla­
tion continued over a long period, it 
would be possible for today's workers to 
receive larger pensions than their former 
salaries!
Another problem is that personal sav­
ings for retirement are now declining. Dr. 
Munnell believes there will be a serious 
decline in personal savings in the future.9 
If this does happen, it will mean that So­
cial Security benefits will probably rise to 
fill the need which will result in higher 
taxes and even less personal savings. This, 
together with the lower worker-retiree 
ratio, could have drastic effects on the tax 
rates.
Another set of serious problems (and of 
particular interest to women) are centered 
around the concepts of "fair” and per­
sonal "rights.” These problems will be 
covered, along with some possible so­
lutions, in Part II in the next issue.
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Theory & Practice
(Continued from p. 22)
by the possibility of errors or irregularities 
in the circumstances, the auditor's judg­
ment concerning the integrity of man­
agement, and the relationship between 
internal control and the potential for er­
rors or irregularities. In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, however, the 
auditor's reliance on the truthfulness of a 
representation or the validity of a record is 
reasonable. The auditor cannot be ex­
pected to detect unrecorded transactions 
in the absence of finding evidence of their 
existence. In determining the extent to 
which corroboration of management rep­
resentations is necessary, the auditor 
should be aware of and consider those 
circumstances that might predispose 
management to misstate financial state­
ments, for example, adverse financial de­
velopments. However, the auditor is not 
expected to obtain more than reasonable 
satisfaction that management has not 
made material misrepresentations or 
overridden control procedures. There are 
inherent limitations on the effectiveness of 
internal controls which prevent the au­
ditor from placing complete reliance on 
them. The auditor's examination normally 
includes procedures to test the existence 
of errors or irregularities that could have a 
material effect on the financial statements 
even in the absence of material weakness­
es in the system of internal control. 
Additional procedures should be per­
formed if the auditor believes errors or 
irregularities may exist and, depending 
upon the circumstances, the auditor's 
opinion should be qualified or disclaimed 
or the auditor may determine that the only 
course is to withdraw from the engage­
ment.
The auditor's role in IRS investigations 
of questionable payments is apparently 
settled. Now we must wait for the pro­
posed Congressional bill to be enacted, 
amended or dropped. However, it is 
highly improbable that legislation will not 
be forthcoming, even if substantially 
amended. The proposals of the AICPA in 
the two exposure drafts need, also, to be 
finalized and may be changed before is­
suance as Statements of Auditing 
Standards. In the meantime, the auditor 
should maintain an attitude of profes­
sional skepticism in planning and con­
ducting examinations of financial state­
ments. Any questionable payments noted 
or suspected might appropriately be han­
dled at the highest level both in the au­
ditor's firm and in the client's organization 
complying with the procedures in the ex­
posure draft on illegal acts.
